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A FREE PRESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
A JUDICIAL VIEW
By WILLIAM F. SMITHit
THE RIGHT to a fair trial by an impartial jury, free from the
pressures of outside influences, is inherent in our system of juris-
prudence and is guaranteed by the sixth amendment. How to ade-
quately safeguard this right against impairment by news publicity,
either in advance of or during trial, and at the same time to preserve
the right of a free press, has been a matter of immense concern for
more than a quarter of a century. It is my view that these rights are
compatible and may exist side by side, each serving its own legitimate
function.
Numerous cases have held news publicity immediately in advance
of trial so pervasive and prejudicial as to have warranted either a
change of venue or a postponement of the trial until after the publicity
had subsided.' But while these remedies are available under our
federal procedural system and are feasible, they are not always ade-
quate, particularly in those situations in which the newspaper pub-
licity is widespread and prolonged. A defendant who is compelled to
resort to one of these remedies impliedly waives either his right to
trial "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime . . ." is alleged to have been committed or his right to "a
speedy . . . trial."2 The resort to either remedy necessarily entails
waiver of another right which may be of equal importance to a
defendant in a particular situation.
The substantive evil which can, and too frequently does, result
from news publicity, either in advance of or during trial, is more
reprehensible when the source of the published information is the
district attorney or his representative, the defendant's counsel or an
associate, or the defendant himself. This is especially true in those
situations in which the scales of justice may be delicately poised be-
tween guilt and innocence.
A case in point is Irvin v. Dowd,3 where the accused was arrested
and charged with a series of brutal murders. After his arrest and in
advance of trial, he was the subject of widespread news publicity
based upon releases issued by the prosecutor and local police authorities.
News stories described him as the "confessed slayer of six," a "parole
f Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). See also Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963) ; Annot., 10 L. Ed. 2d 1243 (1964).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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violator" and a "fraudulent check artist." In addition, on the day
prior to trial, the local news media carried accounts of his alleged con-
fessions. Of the twelve jurors impanelled, eight admitted on voir dire
examination that they had read the stories. The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that his trial under
th2se circumstances violated his right to due process under the four-
teenth amendment.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made the fol-
lowing pertinent observation:
How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict
based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they
entered the jury box, their minds were saturated by press and
radio for months preceding by matter designed to establish the
guilt of the accused? A conviction so secured obviously consti-
tutes a denial of due process of law in its most rudimentary
conception.4
We should recognize that the exploitation of crime news fre-
quently occurs after the apprehension of the accused, when the crime
is under investigation. Too often the source of the news is the investi-
gative agency, the prosecuting official, or defense counsel. These pre-
trial sources of prejudicial information can be foreclosed by remedial
legislation which will in no way adversely affect the right of a free
press. Furthermore, a balance between seemingly conflicting constitu-
tional rights may be achieved if we follow the guides established by
the Supreme Court in a line of landmark decisions.
In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,' it was held that a
newspaper article having a "reasonable tendency" to influence or ob-
struct the administration of justice in pending litigation was punishable
as a contempt of court. This "reasonable tendency" criterion was
unmistakably rejected as inadequate twenty-three years later in Nye
v. United States' and Bridges v. California.7 The Court in Bridges
concluded that the "reasonable tendency" of published information to
interfere with the orderly administration of justice in a pending case
would not place the publication beyond the constitutional protection
of the first amendment; rather, a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice was constitutionally necessary to warrant its
suppression.
4. Id. at 729-30.
5. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
6. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
7. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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Following Bridges, there were a series of cases in which the "clear
and present danger" doctrine was clarified and its application ex-
plained." Under these cases, a "clear and present danger" may be found
to exist only where there is a reasonable likelihood that a published
article or statement will result in a substantive evil and the threat to
the administration of justice is imminent. The issue is always one of
proximity and degree. While the standards inherent in the "clear and
present danger" rule may seem extreme, they must be followed if
remedial legislation is to meet the test of constitutional validity.
A bill now pending in Congress,' if modified to meet constitutional
standards, will read as follows:
It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee of the
United States, or for any defendant or his attorney or the agent
of either, to furnish or make available for publication information
not already properly filed with the court which is reasonably likely
to affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except
evidence that has already been admitted at the trial. Such contempt
shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.
(Emphasis added.) 10
The proposed legislation was approved by the Judicial Conference of
the United States at its session in March of 1965.
This bill will in no way abridge the constitutional right of the
news media under the first amendment. It is limited in its application
to district attorneys and their assistants, investigative agencies of the
government, defense attorneys and their assistants, and the defendant.
It prohibits the release, either in advance of or during trial, of informa-
tion "which is reasonably likely to affect the outcome" of the pro-
ceeding. Notwithstanding its clear limitations, the proposed legislation
has not escaped criticism.
Several critics hold the view that the right of "freedom of the
press" is absolute under all circumstances. This view is clearly
erroneous." The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "freedom
of the press" must be subordinated to other interests when such sub-
ordination is necessary for our protection against a substantive evil
which Congress has a right to prevent. For example, in Dennis v.
8. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ;
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). See also Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
9. S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
10. Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee
of the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1 Sess., pt. 1, at 129 (1965).
11. See Richardson, Freedom of Expression, 65 HARv. L. RmV. 1 (1951).
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United States,2 the Court held that the guarantee of the first amend-
ment did not protect the right of a person to advocate the overthrow
of the government by violence. In Schenck v. United States," Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated: "The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent." Mr. Justice Frankfurter also stated in his concurring
opinion in Irvin that: "This Court has not yet decided that the fair
administration of criminal justice must be subordinated to another
safeguard of our constitutional system - freedom of the press, prop-
erly conceived."' 4
The same critics appear to equate "freedom of the press" with the
"right of the public to know." These concepts are not legally synony-
mous and cannot be equated on any constitutional basis. The constitu-
tional right to a fair trial is obviously superior to the "right of the
public to know," which is clearly lacking in constitutional support.
Within the scope of the public's right to know, however, there is a
fair area of inquiry open to the news media which cannot be foreclosed
or restricted. But neither the press nor the public have a right to be
contemporaneously informed by the law enforcement officials of the
nature and details of evidence accumulated during the course of investi-
gation. The guarantee of the first amendment cannot be invoked as
a basis for compelling disclosure of such information, the publication of
which may be reasonably likely to impair the right of an accused to a
fair trial.
There are other critics who urge that remedial legislation is
neither desirable nor necessary. They argue that the disciplinary
powers inherent in the courts are sufficient to enable them to deal with
members of the bar who are guilty of flagrant violations of the
standards of professional ethics. In the case of State v. Van Duyne,
15
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a county prosecutor who
collaborated in the publication of information likely to influence the
outcome of pending criminal litigation was subject to disciplinary
action under Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.6 We
entertain serious doubt as to the efficacy of disciplinary action as a
remedy.
12. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14. 366 U.S. 723, 730 (1963).
15. 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
16. The court found that there was no such collaboration in the cited case.
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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The Canon reads in pertinent part as follows:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and other-
wise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they
are to be condemned .... An ex parte reference to the facts should
not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file
in the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any
ex parte statement.
17
While this canon provides a standard of professional conduct it
contains no prohibition against activities which are reasonably likely
to interfere with the fair administration of justice. It is open to a
further criticism since it is not enforceable against law enforcement
officials, other than members of the bar who may be guilty of flagrant
violations of the standard. These officials are frequently the sources of
prejudicial information released in advance of trial.
17. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OV PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
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AN ACADEMIC VIEW
By ROBERT B. McKAYt
M Y ASSIGNMENT is to present an "academic" view. On occa-
sions like this when the world of legal education, which I repre-
sent, is brought into confrontation with the "real" world of prosecutors,
judges, and members of the news media, I am troubled by the word
"academic." Of the two meanings of that word that might apply to
my mission, I must reject that which would translate my topic as "A
Scholarly View of Free Press and Fair Trials." I do not have any
thing particularly scholarly to say because I do not regard this as the
kind of problem that yields to an arm-chair philosophy of law. The
issue involves a fundamental clash of values for which a practical
solution must be found.
I must accordingly speculate that I am asked here in response to
the other possibly relevant meaning of "academic." That is, I am ex-
pected - or at least permitted - to make observations that are, in
the words of my dictionary, "far from immediate reality; not practical
enough; too speculative."
Let me say at once that my hosts did not make the invitation
explicit in these terms. Probably they had nothing more sinister in
mind than the need for what is sometimes beguilingly described as a
"balanced view." And it is true my lack of direct experience with
either the news media or the prosecutorial function might suggest a
"balance" of sorts; but I must at once confess my disqualification in
this respect, too. My view is not balanced at all.
The discussion of this subject today, as always, has a wonderfully
"on the one hand - on the other hand" quality about it in which all
the participants fairly exude fairmindedness. But I refuse to play
the role of marshmallow in the middle of that accordion. However
wrong my views may seem to some or all of you, at least my convictions
are firm.
The starting point for me is fairly clear. Enough of sanctimonious
assurances that the news media believe in fair trials. Of course they
do. And so do we all believe in motherhood; but the birth control pill
is sweeping the country.
My thoughts about prosecutors are scarcely more generous. When
district attorneys protest their belief in freedom of the news media, I
have no doubt of their sincerity. A better test of their enthusiasm
t B.S., 1940, University of Kansas; LL.B., 1947, Yale University; Associate
Dean and Professor of Law, New York University.
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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for freedom of expression would be to ask their endorsement of a
free press that portrayed all criminal defendants as the innocent
victims of police vindictiveness.
Even the courts have not helped as much as they should. The
Supreme Court of the United States, which has certainly not failed to
give firm leadership in other areas of the law, has long been stuck
nearly at dead center on this issue. To be sure, there has been a
considerable show of judicial activity in recent years. We know that
in a few extraordinary cases of prejudicial publicity before or during
trial, a conviction may be set aside;' and we were advised in 1965 that
it may be impermissible to televise certain notorious, heavily pub-
licized, and highly sensational criminal proceedings.2 But there is not
much help in all of this for the not-so-celebrated criminal sentenced to
death or an extended prison term following a trial in which jurors
read, heard, or saw matter out of court that could not have been
disclosed to them in court.
It seems outrageous that the courts in this country are still likely
to say blandly that a defendant should not object to a little prejudice
where other evidence of guilt is strong. Like the comforting counsel
of the doctor who told his patient that she was only a little bit
pregnant, this is the doctrine of harmless error carried to its ultimate
absurdity.
Despite all the agitation, I fear we must acknowledge that, as in
the French proverb, the more things change the more they stay the
same. Unhappily, in this instance I am not even sure they are staying
the same. I fear the situation worsens with each passing year. There
is competent testimony that such is the case;' and it is not hard to
credit such statements. In a nation where nearly everyone is literate,
newspapers reach practically all potential jurors in the urban centers
where most criminal actions are tried. Radio and television reach
even more. Even actual jurors, who try to be mindful of a judicial
caution not to read, see, or hear out-of-court references to a pending
case, can scarcely abide those instructions unless put to the personal
inconvenience and public expense of sequestration.
1. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961) ; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
2. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
3. The Special Committee on Radio and Television of The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York reported "an increasingly large number of instances in
recent years when at various stages of prosecution a person in custody of the police is
questioned on television and before miscrophones." SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO AND
TELEVISION, RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THs ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1965).
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It is small wonder that a respected English writer, Professor
Harry Street, should describe the situation in the United States for
his home audience in these words:
In the United States, the Press is free to assist in detection
of crime, to interview witnesses and suspects and report their
observations, to comment on trials as they proceed, and to give
opinions on the guilt of suspects.4
If I were called upon to grade that statement for accuracy in its
portrayal of the relevant law on the subject, I confess that I wouldn't
quite give it a perfect score. Professor Street paints with somewhat
too broad a brush, omitting altogether the little qualifications and the
occasional exceptional cases. But is it not also true that the very
scarcity of those exceptional cases serves to emphasize the fact that
press and prosecution do work hand in hand to ferret out crime (so
far so good) and to insure conviction of those they consider deserving
of punishment?
It is entirely understandable that police and prosecutors should
support press freedom as stoutly as do the news media. All agree
that maximum freedom must be preserved. The news media, paying
court to that shining shibboleth, "the people's right to know," argue
for their right to search out and report the news, defined as anything
that someone more or less responsibly asserts as fact or colorful
opinion. The Supreme Court of the United States has confirmed that
view; we are told that this is what freedom of expression is all about.
The first amendment protects the right to say foolish things as well
as important; the false as well as the true; in many cases the de-
famatory as well as the laudatory; and, except perhaps in the area of
obscenity, things that are utterly without redeeming social importance
as well as the most profound thoughts concerning religion, literature,
and science.
Those who argue for significant judicial restriction on the press
are simply whistling in the dark. It is not about to happen, and I for
one am glad. Our society has expressed a preference for freedom of
expression, recognizing that other sacrifices may be required. This
does not mean, however, that a dramatic clash between two constitu-
tional principles is inevitable. It does mean that we must acknowledge
the constitutional realities and the practical consequences. High-
principled talk about accommodation between two great constitutional
imperatives is cheap. But, like the emperor's new clothes, the failure
to recognize reality has continued too long.
4. STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THE LAW 156 (Pelican paperback
1963).
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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My basic position is very simple, which probably means that it
will be regarded with some suspicion. Let me put it to you in the
form of a few unadorned propositions, then seek at least partial re-
covery of my original billing as an academic by providing a modest
amount of legal embroidery.
(1) Fair trial rights are not at present adequately protected
against prejudicial publicity.
(2) Fair trial rights cannot be secured at the price of limitations
on free expression.
(3) Fair trial rights can be protected in part by judicial sanctions
against lawyers, executive sanctions against police officers,
and sanctions imposed by news media organizations against
their members.
(4) Fair trial rights must depend for their ultimate protection
upon effective judicial control over the trial process, in-
cluding occasional reversal of convictions.
FIRST
Despite a few relatively recent reversals of criminal convictions
where publicity before or during trial made fair trial almost certainly
unattainable, most courts, federal and state alike, still reject such claims
on one of two comforting grounds: (1) that the prejudice was not
substantial; or (2) that jurors exposed even to the most virulently
prejudicial material had stated their ability to give a fair decision.
These are strange arguments for lawyers to make. We take great
pride in our Anglo-American tradition that demands fair trials, in-
cluding the elaborate rules of evidence designed to assure as nearly
as possible that everything presented to the trier of fact is relevant,
probative, and trustworthy. In recent decades the Supreme Court of
the United States has formulated an impressive array of constitutional
guarantees to prevent a jury from learning about involuntary con-
fessions, to exclude the products of unreasonable search and seizure,
and to prevent the use of statements not made in the presence of a
lawyer or secured without proper deference to the privilege against
self-incrimination.
It is accordingly all the more remarkable that the vital reasons
behind these rules should be utterly disregarded when evidence that
is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial - and prejudicial - becomes
available to jurors absent these carefully constructed judicial controls.
We are assured that there is no empirical demonstration that
jurors are in fact prejudiced by what they see, hear, or read outside
SUMMER 1966]
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the courtroom. Even if true, which I doubt, how can we possibly
accept that proposition unless we are also willing to relax our ex-
clusionary rules to permit admissibility in court of false statements of
fact, free-swinging opinions of interested parties, and prejudicial
characterizations of persons and events not subject to cross-examina-
tion. Lawyers instinctively recoil from such suggestions because they
are alien to the refined due process concepts painstakingly developed
over the centuries.
I submit that it is not open to serious doubt that a potential juror
will be more impressed with what he sees, hears, or reads when an
accused is first apprehended than with the more rehearsed quality of
the courtroom presentation. Yet it is only very recently that this
fundamental truth has been at all recognized by courts in the United
States. The first case of any significance did not occur until 1954
when, in Juelich v. United States,' the Fifth Circuit reversed a con-
viction in which all twelve jurors had conceded before trial that they
had an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Surely the court was
right in reversing the conviction in the confident belief that the jurors'
assertions of ability to limit their determination to the evidence pre-
sented in court was more a statement of hope than of probable reality.
Perhaps the unanimity of the jurors' bias made that an easy
decision; but it is distressing that it was necessary to wait until 1954
for the revelation of this simple truth. Moreover, the Juelich case was
routinely considered not controlling where less than all, even though a
majority, of the jurors admitted fixed opinions in advance of trial.
Not until 1961 did the Supreme Court reverse any state court con-
viction on the ground of possible jury prejudice resulting from news-
paper publicity, and that was in the startlingly clear case of Irvin v.
Dowd' where 268 of the 430 persons on the jury panel were excused
for cause because of fixed opinions. Eight of the twelve who did
serve admitted that they believed the accused to be guilty. Even that
decision, however, was not a fundamental rejection of the past. The
Court observed:
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to
rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would
be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror
can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on evidence presented in court.7
5. 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954).
6. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
7. Id. at 723.
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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In view of that partial retraction of the announced principle, it
is not surprising that state courts and lower federal courts continue
to find that a defendant's failure to demonstrate actual prejudice (an
impossible burden) plus judicial words of caution are enough to pro-
tect the rights of the accused. For example, in the first six months of
the 1965 Term of the Supreme Court, I find nine cases filed with the
Court in which it was asked to review claims of due process denial
because of inflammatory publicity.8 In every instance the lower court
had ruled that there had been a failure to show prejudice or that all
problems were solved by a judicial caution to the jurors against voting
their bias. The Court denied review in seven of those nine cases,
taking only Sheppard v. Maxwell,' which is pretty strong stuff, and
Hoffa v. United States,'° where the Court excluded that issue from
its grant of review.
One cannot help recalling Mr. Justice Jackson's admonition: "The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instruc-
tions to the jury . . .all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction."" Even in the generally admirable opinion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in State v. Van Duyne,12 which I want to commend
in a moment, the court concluded that, in the circumstances, and in
view of independent evidence of guilt, the newspaper publicity did not
interfere with fair trial. The trouble is that the courts can nearly
always reassure themselves, particularly where the evidence of guilt
is strong, that the jurors could arrive at a fair verdict. How many
times must we be reminded that the due process guarantees are not
limited to the innocent?
SECOND
The first amendment does not permit temporizing with freedom
of the press. Whether the charge of interference with fair trial arises
in the context of a trial by judge without jury, a grand jury proceed-
ing, or a trial to a petit jury, the Supreme Court of the United States
8. Stupak v. United States, 345 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829
(1965) United States v. Andrews, 347 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956
(1965) United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S.
1024 (1966) ; United States v. Conte, 349 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
926 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. granted. 382 U.S.
916 (1965) United States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
904 (1965); Butler v. United States, 351 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 283
U.S. 309 (1966) ; Illinois v. Clements, 32 Ill. 2d 232, 204 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 827 (1965); Illinois v. Hagel, 32 Il. 2d 413, 206 N.E.2d 699, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 942 (1965).
9. 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
granted, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
10. 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 1024 (1966).
11. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
12. 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
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is not about to approve the English pattern of contempt citations
directly against the news media, against others who criticize judge or
jury, or even against those whose out-of-court statements might
prejudice the fairness of a prospective or present judicial proceeding.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has regularly been quoted by those who
would limit the press when he said:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of
criminal justice must be subordinated to another safeguard of
our constitutional system - freedom of the press, properly con-
ceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions
must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the
minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is
constitutionally protected in plying his trade. 3
But it must be remembered that this was said in a concurring
opinion where the possibility of a sanction against the press was not
involved at all. The issue was whether the notion of fair trial required
the reversal of a conviction in which eight of the jurors had stated
on voir dire that they thought the defendant was guilty. The Court
unanimously reversed the conviction, and no one joined Frankfurter's
separate opinion.
It is worth remembering that the Supreme Court of the United
States has never reviewed a contempt citation against a newspaper,
radio, or television station in a jury case. Every contempt case in
any way suggesting interference with the administration of justice
by the press has involved criticism of a court or grand jury;14 and no
contempt citation has been sustained by the Supreme Court since 1918,
in Toledo Aewspaper Co. v. United States,'5 which was in turn
overruled by Nye v. United States" in 1941.
The only case in which there is an opinion by any member of the
Supreme Court in a case in which contempt had been sought against
the press (here a radio station) was Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc. 7 in which the Court declined to review a state court
judgment refusing to find contempt. In that case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, again speaking only for himself, raised a question whether
some restriction might be imposed on the press. All else is silence.
13. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
14. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941).
15. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
16. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
17. 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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If the question of sanctions against the press for prejudicial publicity
is open, it is only so in the most technical sense.
Those who accept the first amendment freedoms begrudgingly
may be inclined to view this result as a victory for the news media
and a defeat for fair trial. But surely that is too narrow a view.
While the sensationalism that characterizes much reporting of criminal
proceedings may not represent the most socially useful disposition of
available newsprint and air time, this almost wanton freedom finds its
support in the premises behind the first amendment. It was the
judgment of the authors of the first amendment that nearly all ex-
pression must be permitted because no one, including the judiciary,
is wise enough to sort out the true, the relevant and the useful from
the false, the immaterial, and, to borrow a phrase from the troubled
area of obscenity regulation, that which is "utterly without redeeming
social value.'
8
It is important that police action be subject to public scrutiny;
it is vital that the conduct of judicial proceedings not be isolated from
examination. It is regrettable that in the process we must expect
some breaches of good taste - and worse; but that fact does not
justify burning the house of freedom to roast the press. As I shall
suggest in a moment, relief can be had against the worst abuses.
Cautious progress is already being made, and I believe the time is
now appropriate for acceleration of current experiments.
Meanwhile, it may be appropriate before I criticize the news
media, as I am about to do, to put in a good word in their behalf.
Let me paraphrase slightly what Lois Forer said in her 1953 prize-
winning Ross essay:
In a single society encompassing [nearly two hundred mil-
lion] people and stretching [beyond] the width of a continent,
the media of mass communication assume great significance.
• ..The New England town meeting could draw into the demo-
cratic process the entire community. Such personal participation
is no longer possible. The media of mass communication must
be the vital link between the people and the government. This is
recognized in the elective process, both in the initial choice of
executives and legislators and in the correlative watchful eye
which the electorate of a healthy democracy must keep upon the
elected. The same problems and the same considerations apply
to the relations between the people and the judiciary.'9
18. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
19. Forer, A Free Press and a Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800, 803 (1953) ; AALS,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 637, 642 (1963).
SUMM ER 1966]
13
Smith: A Judicial View
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THIRD
Too much time has already been lost in hopelessly irresolute talk
about the conflict between fair trial and free press, as though the
issue involved only an intellectual abstraction and not real people.
Talk should end and action should no longer be delayed. Factual
information is now conveniently available in a number of places, in-
cluding the notable report by the Special Committee on Radio and
Television of the Bar of the City of New York in the 1965 volume
entitled Radio, Television, and the Administration of Justice. A re-
port is due in the fall of 1966 from the Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press of the American Bar Association Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, which is under the chair-
manship of Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. There are also important studies in progress, with
reports expected soon from other committees of the American Bar
Association on revision of the Canons of Professional Ethics and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Especially important is the fact that the courts and the bar
associations are at last demonstrating increasing willingness to take
specific action to discipline members of the legal profession who
violate agreed-upon standards. I particularly applaud the promise of
the New Jersey Supreme Court to use the contempt power to dis-
cipline members of the bar who make unwarranted statements that
might endanger fair trial rights."0 In addition, the court quite properly
recommends disciplinary action against similar conduct by nonlawyer
police officers; but the disciplinary authority here resides with their
supervisors rather than with the courts.
In April of 1965, Attorney General Katzenbach announced
rather detailed rules to govern the disclosure by members of the Depart-
ment of Justice of material that might be prejudicial.2 ' While I
predict that experience will show that his rules are not restrictive
enough, this is clearly a good beginning; and there is no reason to
believe that the Department of Justice will not be willing to tighten
the rules upon demonstration of deficiencies revealed in application.
Also encouraging are the codes worked out by local bar associa-
tions, often in cooperation with the news media. Particularly notable
examples are those in Philadelphia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
20. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
21. Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Information by Personnel
of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings, 30 Fed. Reg. 5510,
28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965).
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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Oregon. For the moment at least, I am content with development
along these lines, encouraging lawyers and lawyer groups to solve
these problems in traditional ways. Only if this proves strikingly
inadequate would I favor resort to criminal sanctions of the sort
contemplated in the Morse bill.22
At the same time it scarcely seems unreasonable to ask the
news media to do a little house-cleaning too. Surely it is not im-
possible for television and radio broadcasters and for press associations
to formulate a code imposing private sanctions for violation of the
terms of that code.
I understand the difficulty in seeking agreement on such a sensi-
tive subject among the proudly individualistic members of the news
fraternity; but the cause is important enough to justify the necessary
effort. Self-discipline of this kind presents no constitutional problems;
other private associations have adopted codes on subjects no less
important.
FOURTH
To the extent that professional self-discipline does not prevent
all disclosures that might prejudice fair trial, courts should more
effectively apply present tools to avoid prejudice, even at the risk of
allowing some few guilty persons to go unconvicted or even
unprosecuted.
I have already indicated my astonishment that we have so long
tolerated procedures that cannot in good conscience be defended as
consistent with fair trial, particularly when traditional legal remedies
are readily available, as pointed out by other participants in this
symposium.23
While I do not claim such academic isolation from the real world
that I fail to understand the practical reasons for pretending that fair
trial is not prejudiced, I do reject those arguments. When I am
told that honest application of the standards we purport to believe in
would result in the release of guilty defendants, I say only that we
must sometimes pay that price in order to preserve our principles.
Indeed, I am convinced that the only reason the idle talk of past
generations has taken concrete form in recent years is that the Supreme
22. S. 290, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
23. I refer, of course, to continuance, change of venue, disqualification of jurors
for cause, sequestration of jurors, and finally, in exceptional cases, reversal for new
trial. See Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM.
L. REv. 349 (1960). In a few instances, courts have excluded the press from hearings
on the admissibility of prejudicial evidence such as confessions or matter alleged to
have been the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
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Court has just that recently indicated that there are limits beyond
which specious claims of nonprejudice cannot be pushed.
If Lee Oswald had survived to stand trial for the assassination
of John Kennedy, it is perfectly apparent that a due process trial of
Oswald would not have been possible anywhere in the United States
for a generation. When courts of last resort rule that other probably
guilty defendants less nationally spectacular, but locally celebrated,
are temporarily or permanently beyond the reach of the law, I assure
you that better procedures will somehow be found endurable. Our
concern for a free press and for fair trial procedures should move us
along that road on a voluntary basis before we are pushed, unwittingly
and unwillingly, along the same route.
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